Some Notes on the Political Role of Labor Movements: A Phillippine Case Study by Wurfel David
Some Notes on the Political Role of Labor Movements. 255 
Some Notes on the Political Role of Labor Movements : 
A Phillippine Case Study 
By David Wurfel 
The Phillippme labor movement has known periods of intense 
political activity. Between 1938担id1941 and again between 1945 
and 1950 this activity was largely under Communist leadership. 
Between 1950 and 1953, however, it was under the non-Communist 
leader ship of the Secretary of Labor.日J But since 1953, unlike 
those h皿 ostother Asian countries, the Philippine labor movement 
has not been political. In fact, even in the earlier periods cited 
non-political unions constituted a substantial seg皿entof the labor 
ロiovement.
The present situation needs to be described and the interpretive 
problems it presents need to be discussed. It is our purpose here 
to define“poht1cal unionis田”， togive evidence of its non-existense 
in contemporary Philippine politics, and to try to analyze the factors 
determining the political character of labor movements in the 
Philippines, or elsewhere. 
A Deft筑＇ition 
A political union, as the term will be employed here, is one 
which is used priniarily to achieve political power and only secon帽
darily, if at al, as machmery through which to gain control of 
the job situat10n. The primary emphasis on political goals may 
be a faithful reflection of rank and五leopinion or it may be merely 
the expression of a leader’s ambition. The attempt to use the umon 
自orpolitical purposes may, on the other hand, come from outside 
the organi日 tionentirely. Usually the outside group desiring to 
put the union to political use is a political party, or an individual 
party leader Ruhng elites as well as counter elites have recog-
(1〕 Seethe author’s“Trade Union Development and Labor Relations 
Policy回 thePhilippmesヘIndustrialand Labor Relotions E帥 iew,
12 4 (July 1959〕， especially,pp. 585-590. 
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mzed the political utility of labor unions. Thus they皿aybe 
manipulated by either govermnent or opposition parties. But 
whether the political direction comes from within or without the 
union, and 、vhetherit does or does not express the true desire of 
the maJo口tyof union members, labor union activity which gives 
priority to gaining political power and second place to immediate 
economic goals is clear and su伍cientevidence of political unionism. 
The Contempoγα叩 Philitゆi田 Scene
The year 1953 was a turning point both for Philippine politics 
and for the Philippine labor movement. A sweepmg revision of 
labor legislation, shifting the emphasis of policy from judicial 
arbitrat10n to collective bargaining, was embodied in the Indmtnal 
Peace Act, which passed Congress in May.(2) Secretary of Labor 
Figueras, who had h。pedto be elected to the Senate with labor 
backmg, was defeated m November along with other Liberal candi-
dates Subsequently the dommant labor organization, the National 
Confederation of Trade Unions, which he had controlled, collapsed. 
Under the Magsaysay administrat10n, which took office in January 
1954, Secretary of Labor Adevoso built no union empire for him-
self and, in fact, kept hands off mternal umon affairs generally. 
Smce 1953, despite the pr田encein tjieir midst of many politically 
ambitious union leaders, most Philippine unions o伍ciallyaspire to 
a political role similar to that of U. S. trade unions, and have 
concen廿atedon pressuring Congress for better labor legislation and 
on c叩 didateendorsement. It shoul在 benoted that this kmd of 
“political activity”does not have achievement of political power 
as its primary goal, but revision of particular government policies 
affecting the worker on the job. It should be remembered also 
that dunng the period in question even this kind of political activity 
did not constitute a maJor part of trade union work. The description 
of these activities will apply primarily to the period 1954 1956. 
Influencing Legislation The most persistent and sophisticated 
attempt to keep union members in日armedon legislation and legis-
lators, and to encourage them to write letters to their Congressmen, 
(2〕 RepublrcAct 875 See ibid., pp. 593 595. 
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was the work of the Political Action Connnittee of the Federation 
of Free Workers, assisted by that union’s newspaper. The Free 
Workers, a Catholic trade union organized in 1950 with Jesuit 
advice, was one of the “big four ”national unions of this period, 
along with the Philippine AS8ociation of Free Labor Unions 
(PAFLU), the National Labor Unionσ<LU), aod the Philippine 
Trade Union council 〔PTUC).
The PTUC, at that tune the youngest and largest trade union 
center m the Plulippines, voted at its 1955 convention that: 
Whereas, it is the duty of the Political Action Co皿田itteeto 
inform the executive board or the convention on how Congress-
men aod Senators voted on economic and social reform bills so 
that the execu.tive board or the convention may be gmded ac-
cordingly; be 1t resolved ... that the proper departments of 
the PTUC should secure the necessary data as above stated from 
the Congressional五les.
But there 1s no indication that that motion was ever carried out. 
A resolution presented to the 1956 convention“that the PTUC 
create a political action department under the charge of a full-time 
director to represent the views of the organi血 tionon al matters 
aぽectmgthe working man ぺwasnot adopted. 
Thus the broad maodate that the PTUC consti加tiongives the 
organization in the political realm has not yet been utihzed. Be-
sides constant“work for progressive labor leg1slat1on and for its 
effective implementation”and defense of“the civil and political 
rights of the working peopleヘtheaim of the PTU C is stated in 
i白 constitutionto be “to work for the establishment and preser” 
vation of a Just and democratic society free from anti-social con-
centration of economic and political power h 田 yform ” This 
inight have been used as the constitutional basis for full-scale 
PTUC political involvement, but was not. 
・The constitution of PAFLU, the smallest of the “big fourヘ
states one of that organizations' aims to be “to mitiate, foster and 
support aoy ... legislation in the mterests of the working class ... 
and the countηr, [and] help enforce existmg laws bene五cialto the 
commonweal.” The basic document of NLU, the oldest of the 
“big fourぺhasno provision relating to pohncal action. 
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There have been some occasions on which concerted union 
pres町四 has:>ctually been brought to bear on legislative町 admin-
istrative decision-making. The nature of the pressure has varied 
considerably from the American model, however, which is obvi叩 sly
the basis for u国nyphrases in umcn constitutions. Demons廿ations
before the Congress building and the presidential palace have re-
placed letter writing as the major technique. This is due in large 
part to the heavy u血onconcentration in Manila and the inability 
of Manila leaders to mobilize labor ele皿entsin most provincial 
constituencies. It also reflects the much greater i田portancein 
Philippine culture given to face-to-face contacts in compariscn to 
correspondence, as well as labor’s feeling that it must i皿pressthe 
p旧blic,not just officialdom, with its importance. 
One example of considerable union e田町tto influence leg1s-
lation was the question of Minimum Wage Law amendment 
Though there had been constant complaint in business circles about 
the terrible c氾stto employers ever since the Law’s passage in 19!il, 
only in the自rstyear of the Magsaysay administration was an open 
drive begun 百orthe Law's amendment. In July 1954 Secretary of 
Agriculture Salvador Araneta, an able “sugar bloc ”spokes四百h
urged the immediate amendment of the law to allow municipal 
and provincial autcnomy in fixmg minima (3) He charged that the 
existing nation-wide minimum of P2.50 per day for agricultural 
workers and P4.00 per day for industrial workers was“unreal-
istically" high and was theref.耐ea major四国eof une皿ployment,
forcmg employers to hire fewer men than they would at a lcwer 
wage. He repeated his charge and his proposal several times in 
the next few months. Secretary Adevoso counter-attacked with 
his marshalled arguments, and the unions gave him public support. 
A meeting in October of representatives from PTUC, PAFLU, 
NLU叩 dsome independents called for Araneta's resignation (<) It 
was also decided there to stage a demonstration in pre test against 
the Araneta suggest10ns玖 Sec Adevcso requested the uruons to 
call it off, since Araneta charged that Adevoso was“regimentmg” 
( 3) Manila Times, July 17, 1954. 
( 4) MT, Octob2T 23, 1954. 
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the unions in order to embarass him.C町 Butthe demonstration 
was held anyway at the Department of Agriculture building. 
Placard carrymg demonstrators were almost al members of PTUC 
a伍liates. Secretary Araneta was out of town.CG) 
Demonstrators do not make policy, but the strong union sup-
portおrAdevoso’s articulate and well-argued defense of the Mmi-
mum Wage Law may have won one victory, i e in the composi-
tion of a mimmum wage study commission. In October President 
Magsaysay had announced that“in view of the agitation from 
provincial governors”， he would name an“executive and legis戸
lative committee which will study the conditions arising from the 
operat10n of the h必nimumWage Law”m If this committee had 
included Congressmen, its hearings would have become centers of 
political controversy, and the “sugar bloc" would nndoubtedly 
have been well repr出ented. But when it was actually appointed 
in November, it was“non-partisanぺchairmanedby the Secretary 
of National Defense with four committeemen of scienti五C or aca-
demic backgronnds.C8l The committee's report, released several 
months later, supported the Minimum Wage Law m its existm百
五orm,denying that there was adequate justificat10n for revision. 
Agitation agamst the Minimum Wage Law was not stopped by 
the initiation of a study, however. In Congress a pre-session ma-
jority caucus in January 1955 approved the proposal of the House 
Committee on Provincial and Municipal Governments, chaired by 
Rep. Lamberto Macias of sugar”rich Negros, to lower the minimum 
wage for public works laborers in the provinces. It had the sup-
port of House maJority leadership.（町 Approximatelythe same 
proposal was included as a“rider" to the public works bil 
Despite the Senate’s initial rejection and the attempt of the House 
Labor Committee to delay the bil, the rider appeared in the confer-
ence committee rδport, fixing the public works projects' ininima 
( 5) MT, October 25, 26, 1954. 
(6〕 MT,October幻， 1954
(7〕 MT,October 26, 19日
〔8) MT, Nov田nb訂 18,1954. 
( 9) MT, January 19, 1955 
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at '!"2.50 mstead of the legal '!"4.00, and was finallγadopted.(10) 
U凶onleade四 ccndemnedthe bill several times as it went 
through the legislative mill. Atty. Rafael of the Philippine Labor 
Unity Movement (11) threatened a 10-mmute nation田wideprot田t
strike by PLUM a伍liateson April 30, but there is no indication 
that the tlueat was carried out. After the public works bill was 
passed by Congress, PTUC and PAFLU made plans of their o、m
白ora protest demonstration ［町田idwarned that a nation-wide sit 
dm四istrike would be held if Pres. Magsaysay signed the bill with 
the rider.〔1') There was a“march on l¥在alacafiang”onAugust 
18, at which tnne sev町 alleaders, including Cid of PAFLU，拍d
Hernandez, Oca and Malonzo of PTUC p町 senteda joint resolu-
tion asking the president’s veto of the rider. l¥在agsaysayanswered 
that he was“studying”the possibility of a veto, but explained 
there might be legal impediments. He “feared ”that if he vetoed 
the rider, the whole public works appropriation would be lost.開〕
Such a state沼田ntse回目d to re九reala misunderstanding of the 
constitution, which specifically provides for an item veto of ap-
propriation bills 
The P町 sidentdid not veto it. However, neither did the 
PTUC have to hold its sitdown strike. Magsaysay sought a ccm-
promise and let R A 1411, the Public Works Act, become law 
without his signature On September 16 after another conference 
with labor leaders, represe坦ting al major federatrnns except 
PTUC 051, the President五nallypromised to follow Sec Adevoso's 
suggestion that the '!"4. 00 rate be continued on pub！日cworks pro-
iects as long as f山idsheld out. 
A maior assault on the minimum wage law had been averted, 
but hew important the u田町内 rolehad been in preventing it is 
di缶四ltto gauge. Without Sec Adevoso the result would have 
(10〕MT,M可 1,1955, August 弘 1955.ο！） MT, April 22, jgS5, 
(12) MT, August 14, 1955. 
(13) A“public md1gnafon de皿onstration”washeld in loilo on August 
15 against the rider under au甲icosof 出eInter-Island Labor Org. 
MT, August 17, 1955. 
ο4〕 MT,August 19, 1955. 
(15〕 MT,September 17, 1955 
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certainly been di能 rent. But it is doubtful if his position would 
have carried as much weight without vocal union backing Pres. 
Magsaysay was ea叫yunpressed by demonstrat10ns （向
On another issue, however, labor injunctrnns by Ccurts of 
First Instance, one in which the President’s respon回同市tywas less 
direct, labor demonstrations were less successful. After several 
crippling iniunctmns agamst picketing in early 1956, weakenmg 
strikes by unions a侃hated回 allthe national trade unro江 centers,
the unions decided t。protest They charged, with justification, 
that these iniunctions had been issued without adherence to the 
procedural reqmrements of the Industrial Peace Act, the “Magna 
Carta of Labor＇’； theヴ deniedthat Courts of First Instances had 
Jurisdiction over labor disputes at al, if the law were properly 
interpreted; and they proposed an amendment to R. A. 875 to 
speci五ca!lydepnve these Courts of such jurisdiction 
To impress upon the government the serio isness of i臼 plrght,
and to reinforce its arguments, the labor movement approached 
complete町1ityin a mass protest on June 2. Leaders of all major 
federations had breakfast with Pres. Magsaysay, p問 senting their 
vie澗 sto him in a conference which lasted all morning. In the 
mean ti皿enearly 10,000 union members marched on the City Hall, 
seat of the Courts of First Instance, then on to Ma!acanang, a 
few blocks away. The breakfasting leaders joined the President 
on the lawn as he五acedhundreds of placards asking him to re-
quest Congress to amend the Magna Carta to lrm1t the CFI's 
iurisdict10n. Speaking to the demonstrating unionists, Pres. l¥在ag-
悶 ysayurged them to be patient smce the inJunction issue was 
shortly to be decided by the Supreme Court ; nevertheless, to-
gether with the House Labor Committee Chairman and Vice-Chmn, 
he promised to have introduced the necessary amendment to the 
Magna Carta. At the same time nearly 20,0DO additional workers 
in factories inside Manila and out，皿embersof PTUC, PAFLU 
and PLUM a伍.liates,walked off their Jobs m protest, 11: 00 a.m. 
(16〕 Jn fact, he w田 accus'dby s町田 ofhis criti田 of“governingby 
delegation ヘie. making decisions on the basis of the size and可1acifer圃
ation of delegations to Malaoafiang, the presidential palace, represent-
ing particular points of view. 
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to 12・00noon. This was the first non目Communistpolit1cal strike 
in Philippine labor history ; itis not hkely, however, to mark the 
beginning of a new pattern of trade union political behavior, judg司
mg from its results. 
Seeming四 ccessfor the unions' e臼ortswas ephe芯neral. The 
special session of Congress, which could not act on any皿ea問問
not certi五edto it by the President, came and went without the 
apperance of any bill regarding miunctions. In September the 
Supreme Court did indeed rule on the issue, but not entirely as 
the unions had wished. In a 6 to3 decis10n it held出at也eCFI 
did have jurisdiction over certain labor disputes and did have the 
power to restr剖npicketmg, but it likewise held that 出eMagna 
Carta’s procedural町qui問団ents had to be met by the Court of 
First Instance in such cases, and invalidated the injunction in 
question for not having met・ them.(17) Labor demonstrations had 
little a旺ecton the nation’s highest tribunal. 
CandZdate Endorsement. Political action by “non-political” 
trade unions traditionally includes endorsement of candidates as 
well as lobbying for or against legislauon. Philippme labor leaders 
have undertaken this task with great relish, but with less con-
四回cy. The pn onahzation of Philippine political relationships 
generally and the relative unimportance of ISsues, added to the 
personal poli包calambitions of the central labcr leadership and the 
network of ties between them and leadmg politicians, causes much 
political endorsement to have litle relationship to a candidate's 
record on labor and social welfare i回目es. Even though the eight-
man list system for eleとtionof Senators from a national constitu-
・ency tends to call greater at出ntion回 theisrnes and give greater 
importance to nation-wide interest gro旧psthan does any other 
Philippine political contest, the 195fi senatorial elect10n is a good 
example of me宜忌ctiveendorsement. 
In 1955 there were two endorsing groups, the PTUC, and the 
“Labor Alliance ヘcomposedof the PAFLU, NLU, PLUM, and 
the Citizens' Labor Un10n, which had been formed m Sep回 nber.
The Labor Alliance was五rsttn publish its endorsements Early 
(17) MT, September 1. 1956. 
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in October the component u凶ons'respective leaders, Attys. Cid, 
Lernm, Rafael and Ty, had sent a Jetter and questionnaire to al 
senate candidates. Half of the ten questions were general and 
leading, such as“、へihatdo you plan to do自orlabor”， and the 
other half were fairly spec凶c,and leadmg, such as“Are you in 
favor of repealmg the mimmum wage rider？” Only three candi-
dates bothered to answer Neyertbeless the four leaders of the 
Labor Alliance met on October 26 and drew up a slate. In tbe 
自amboyanthyperbole of Atty. Rafael his Labor News【問 reported,
“The en tire strength of orgamzed labor led by over one million 
votes of Labor Alliance a伍liates has been committed to elect a 
nme-man senatorial list led by Sen Recto, well-loved statesman 
and legisla回r.”Actually,of course, no one, but出eleaders, was 
“committed”to anyone, and the endoreements were sent to the 
locals so lateー lessthan two ・weeks before the election-that most 
of the rank and五leprobably did not even learn of their leader’s 
preferences. Only three out of the nine were actually elected. 
The PTUC executive board, without taking the trouble to 
send out letters or questionaires, met to endorse its list of candi-
dates on November 3, one week before the elec包on. Their slate, 
which was identical witb that of the Labor Alliance except for 
one name, mcluded four winners out of rune-but not because of 
union efforts. 
Who were tbese “friends of labor ”？ It is interesting，五rst
of al, to note that the majority of botb PTUC and Labor Alliance 
tickets were made up of Liberal Party candidates Tbough almost 
al unionists had actively suppor阻dE在agsaysayin 1953, lns failure 
either to veto the public works rider or to present a bil hm1ting 
the Courts of First Instance labor jurisd1ction had cooled their 
ardor for his cause Said PAFLU Pres. Cid，“Labor is disap-
pointed with tbe record of the Nacionlista Party.”（日｝
Three of the nme endorsees had fairly consistent pro田labor
records. Senators h在agalonaand Peralta, both Liberals, had 
actively opposed the pubhc works rider ; Magalona bad been one 
(18) MT, October 31, 1955. 
(19) MT, Septe四，ber15, 1956. 
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of the main authors of the Industrial Peace Act. Sen. Paredes 
〔aLiberal recently turned Nacionalista), whぱ＞ rightly clai田ed・ to 
be that Act's senatonal father, also spoke and vo恒dagainst the 
Moreno rider.<"l All three had been absent on the ro!J. call v叫e
to remove home-workers from田凶mumwage law coverage, in 
February 1953, but since in the Philippines a“no”VO恒 issuch 
a rarity, this is perhaps the most that could be expected from 
“friends of labor ”Only Paredes was elected 
Two others had more tenuous claims to the title of labor’s 
“friend”. Congressman Lim (NPつ， headof the House Labor Com-
mit胞e, had been legal counsel of the Mindanao・ Federation of 
Labor. I王iscommit町ehad tried to delay the pubhc works 
rider, by refusing to詑 portit out, but when it was forced out 
to the floor under special rules, Lim vo匝dfor it. Congressman 
Macapagal, who had had, as chairman of the House Foreign 
A宜airsCommittee, considerable responsibility 自or the MWL’s 
passage in 1951, also voted for the works bill which 胞団porarily
reduced也atminimum Both Lnn and Macapagal had voted, in 
May 1952, for tl1e bil removing homeworkers from MWL cover-
age (HB 3085). Lim was elected, but not Macapagal 
Ex-Senators Osias and Pecson, bo吐1Liberals, we町五armer
school缶achers,and their legislative careers displayed their special 
interest in education Neither had taken a particularly constructive 
stand on labor legislanon, however Senator Recto was ch旧sen
for his nationalist sentiments and his skil as an oppositio血 st
Union leaders who publicly endorsed hnn privately admitted that 
he was no“friend of labor ” Not only had he never sponsored 
any labor legislation, nor opposed annlabor legislation, but he 
had vigorously attacked the land reform bill in that阻meyear. 
His extra-governmental income came from legal f民sin payment 
for services rendered to large corporations. Only Recto won. 
On the ninth nominee the bザoslates diverged. The Labor 
Alliance chose Governor Juan Ch10co of Nueva Eciia〔NP)who 
had had a rather liberal policy vis-a-vis tenant unions 皿 hisprov-
ince. The PTUC cbose Social 、へlelfareAdmirus.trator Mrs. Pac1ta 
(20〕 See』'1T,August 9 195正
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五在adrigal－可Varns,<laugh恒rof aロ:llllionaireship”owner. Said the 
o伍dalPTUC message of endorsement. 
Although Mrs. Warns has been rai,ed with the traditional 
silver spoon in her mou也， heruncea,ing work for the less 
prive!eged since she became Social Welfare Admほnistratorbecame 
a turning point in her hfe. Touched deeply by bony arms raised 
in supplication for the simple needs in life, .. Mrs. Warns gave 
up a life of ease to dedioa te her time五or吐ieunderpriveleged. 
Af記rthe election investigations revealed that she had diver匝d
over Pl00,000 of Social Welfare Administration money to her C白n-
paign, which had been the most lavish bid for the Senate which 
the Philippines had yet seen. The bid was successful. 
It should be added that whatever inconsis恒nciesthere were in 
耐slist of endorsees should not be blamed entユrelyon the enc 
dorsers. As long as labor leaders insisted on putting up a・full 
nine-man ticket (21) the choice血eyhad available of truly pro-labor 
candidates was extre皿elylimited 
The Federation of Free Workers was wiser and made no en-
dorsements, even tho igh it did send out questionnaires. The 
ans川町s,fro田 tencandidates, were published in the Free Worker.臼別
Since the “proper”answer could. easily be surmised from the ques-
ticn, and was, in most cases, the one given, the replies were not 
very mea吋ngful. The FFW concentrated its polit日alactivity m 
the Manila mayorial contest, supporting Mayor Lacson whole-
heartedly against ex-Sec問taryFigueras, who had harrassed the 
FFW when he headed the Labor Department. The FFW was世間
only labor group加 campaignstrongly for Lacson. Former NACTU 
a伍liates,the PLUM, and others, backed Figueras. Lacson won. 
One of the most politically-minded labor leaders, Atty.αp叫困
問。 Cid,admitted that labor had “ve巧Flittle”in丑uenceon the 
national elections. Reseller Lim, who was elec恒dm 1955 with 
labor's endorsement, said 1ll r、fovember1956 in answer to union 
threats of retaliation for hls public probe of unions' funds，“There 
(21) One se国 wasfor the unexpired term of Vice-President Garda, who 
W国 asenator when elected to the higher p白t.
(22) October 1955. 
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is no田 chthing as a labor vote.川 23) Communication between 
national leaders and the ran)<: and file is poor And even if it were 
much better, ext回目unionloyalties would stil determine the votes 
of many laborers. 
Cid attributes labor’s lack of political succe田 toits五a1lureto 
establish ties with small farmers This is probably・ true. But in 
the past only the Communists were able to establish such liaison ; 
it is a difficult task which non-Communist labor leaders are not 
likely to accomplish m the near future. 
Politically Ambitio略 Uni，叩 Leadeγs
Though the Philippines does not now have any political umons, 
it has had a long tradition of pohtical unionists, which continues 
until the present Labor leadership has been an important avenue 
to success in a society with a considerable degree of upward social 
mobility. And, since in a highly politi回 lsociety, the greatest 
success is political success, the end of the avenue has usually been 
pohtical office In 1938 a popular Manila columnist wrote : ＜制
While workers elsewhere unite and or宮町tizeand dnve to-
ward a detennined and de白nitegoal, dying a thomand heroic 
deaths for economic opportuni匂 andfreedom, Philippine labor 
al along has been content to meet and banquet annually, listen 
to a solemn speech of the Secretary of Capital, and wrangle on 
the next batch of o伍cersto collect fees and graduate ulti皿ately
into a government job. 
The en trance of union leaders intοthe political elite has not, 
however, created a permanent element of that elite with its first 
loyalty to the interests of labor, despite the neat equation set 
自or也 bythe NACTU official, Ruperto Cristobal : ＜明
The more labor leaders elected to different elective positions 
the better for the free trade um on movement because many will 
work for the immediate accomplishment of its objectives-the 
elimination of poverty and realization of happineSR, peace and 
prosperity in our country. 
(23〕 MT,November 1, 1956. 
く24〕 FredericoM四 gahasin the Trzb1me, Jan国可 16,1938. 
(25）“Government Guidance in the Labor Movement勺 LaborGolden 
Book, 1951, p. 58. 
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Only aveηfew such politicians have remained real friends of 
labor. ー
This is true because, in吐百五rst・place, one-time labor leaders 
who have achieved high public office are a handful, easily absorbed 
into an elite composed of employers and landlords. Because the 
former labor leader wants elite social status, he quickly adopts 
ehte values. Secondly, most men who reached the heights of labor 
leadership were them,elves well”educated and from middle class 
families Their union activity was commenced after they had set 
political goals for themselves and not beおre. They were thus 
never completely “corn mi tted " to由ecause of labor. Even五or
some sons of working class families, who m田 topowerful position, 
for example, Jose Figueras, trade union activity was only used as 
a means to an end after they had begun the socio-political climb. 
An observation which is somewhat more di伍cultto explain is 
that politically ambitious labor leaders intent on entering the po・
litical elite have generally. not felt the necessity of bendmg u凶ons
to their political purposes They have, on the whole, chosen to 
use the techniques of Philippine politics traditionally utilized by 
members of the elite themselves, i. e money, familial and fictic 
relationships, all designed to create mutual obligations quite dis” 
tinct from the role of union leader. This would seem to be a 
trihute to the openess of the Philippine political ehte. 
Some Cyclical and Structuγαl Factors Affecting Labor's Role 
In order to evaluate more adequately the factors contributing 
to the political character of Philippine unionism, we must look 
at出ena田町 oftrade union皿 ovementsgenerally. The first great 
question is why do workers organize? And the second, like unto 
t, is why does their organization assume di出erentforms and pur-
poses in d1庁erent countries at different times ? 
The first, and stil most prevalent, answer ta the畳間tques-
tion is that workers organize in order to transform the political, 
and as a remit the economic, institutions under which they hve. 
This transformation may be violent, extra-legal, and revolutionary, 
or peaceful, legal and evolutionary. Ma目 isthe gr品 testprophet 
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of也efirst school of thought, and the Webbs, perhaps, of the 
second. Adherents of both socialist ideologies have attempted to 
ーー ． 一ー 一司 自put them into practice, with vaηling degrees of success.τ'he 
“initiated”look upon 5uccess as an indication of their “correct" 
concept of labor’s“true " aspirations；也eiropponents call it an 
alien imposition on an es配ntially non-poll ti cal class. 
But the socialist doctrine that workers want to gain political 
power to transform economic society does not help explain叩hy
也eydesire that transformation American econorrusts and his-
tonans have given us some plausible explanations: that workers 
want to achieve higher social status, pre田nteconomic well-being, 
and assurance of future economic well-being, more commonly 
known 町田curity.<26JExponents of these theories agree, however, 
that achieve皿 entof such goals does not necessitate a prior pohtrcal 
transformation to a labor government; so皿eeven con tend mch a 
transformation would be destructive to such an achievement. 
According to the Commons-Perlman吐ieory,the most widely 
accepted one in America，“job consciousnessヘthedesire to con-
甘olscarce job opportunities, is the “true＇’ union motivat10n.<21l 
Says Perhnan自atly，“uniomsmand the striving for shop control 
are id en tical ”．四lHe calls “the same age”long drive by labor for 
an enlarged opportunity for Tom, Dick and E王arrythrough col-
lectrve control ”，“the philo町phyna rive to labor ”，（29) thus endow-
mg it with as much dogmatic correctness as Marx does class con田
－ 
sc1ousness 
Despite his dog皿atism,however, Perhnan is a skilled lnstorian 
and his generaliza包onsare richly exampled仕omRussian, German, 
Bri tr sh and American experience. He believed that“the victory 
of trade unionism over politics”was the result of a method 
(26) See Mark Perlman, Labor Union T heorie.< in A刑eritaくEvanston:
Row, Peterson, and Co., 1958). 
(27) See Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Movement (New York: 
Kelley, 1949), and Philip Taft，“Commo田－P訂1皿anTheory: A Sum-
mary＇’， Industrial Relations Research A田ociation,Proceedings, 1950, 
pp. 140-5. 
(28) Perl皿an,op. cit., p 316 
(29) Ibid., pp. 317-18 
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keeps testing wcial theory in the crucible of concre田 experience".l制
But he did not beh凹 ethat“experience”could ever lead trade 
unions m回 politics. Even if one accep恒也ethesis that“job con-
trol”国 abas1c motivation of trade unionism, and he makes a 
convincing case, Perlman’s own keenly analytlcal histories p町田it
one to observe that experience is a versatile teacher, providing 
impetus for change from the economic to the political tactic, as 
weU as from the political to the economic. Social movements 
seem to seek the hne of least resistance to achieve their goals.日。
The changing political and economic environment determines 
whether workers may achieve social status and economic welfa問
more e旺ectively through political organizat10n and act旧n or 
through a trade unionism which con田 ntratesIts activities within 
the economic relationships of industry. 
Cyclical. What kind of experiences, or environmental changes, 
are most Important? Their classificat10n might be called 也e
cyclical determinants of the character of labor movemen臼. We 
can rny in general that economic crisis, be it in自ati on or increasmg 
unemployment, stirs labor to action.l32l If social security leg1s-
laticn enacted within the existing political fra皿eworkmee臼口市Ii-
mal回q田町men臼 andthe legal climate for trade union orgamza-
t10n and collective bargaining is favorable, labor w1ll e田phasize
job control, smce It is most immediately related 加 thegoals 
(3C) Ibid., p. 105. 
{31) Paradoxi田ly,however, tao litle田sistance曲 pstheir vigor工abor
unions m山stccns品ntl岡田aneuverbetween the Scylla of oppressive 
opposition and the Charybdis of debHitating sue白田． Fer exa血pie,
while U. S. trade union me回bershipmare than doubled f四m 1933 ta 
1938, the depths of the depression, during 出efive years of prosperity 
fro血 19471952 the percentage of union memb町samong wage and 
salary佃 pl町e田 actuallydropped slightly. (See Irvmg Bernstein, 
“Uruon Growth and Structural Cycles ヘIRRA, Proc.-dings, 1954, 
p 209 , and Daniel Bell，“Discu田ionヘop.cit., p. 233.〕
(32) s田 B町・nstein,op. cit., pp. 202-23札 Evidencefrom India p四 sented
by Ornati shows that trade union members th町eoften pay dues only 
ju坑 befo同町 duringstrikes, and expect i国田ediateresults. Th町
gex盟国.1yconsid町 themselves“田町nbers”onlyin periods of strife. 
(See Oscar Ornati, fobs mul Work<rs in India (C町nellUniv., Insti-
tute of International Indust口aland Lab町 Relations,1955〕， p.110.) 
This is also true in 出ePhilippines. 
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workers seek.(33) Iιon the other hand, legal impediments to 
union activity are great, and social security legislation is made-
quate, labor will perforce become more political in its onentat10n. 
Should both labor’s union and polit:tcal activ1t:tes be effectively 
mrpresred, as was true m Japan from 1910 to 1917, ideological 
development, which will tend to be radical, is the only alternat:tve. 
For example, in Germany until 1890 most trade umons were, 
except for the decade 1869-78, illegal. Thus advised of the desira-
hility of the control of state power to protect workers’organiza-
tions, labor, given freedom after 1890, was for a while intensely 
political. However, as・ it became apparent that pohtical labor, 
the Social Democratic Party, was not going to be strong enough 
to achieve power in a short period of time and thus produce favor-
able legislation, and as unions, freed from repression, increased m 
numbers, size, and se1vices to their members, the bulk of unions 
veered from the political path and by 1906 had become inde-
pendent of the Party. Increased legal and economic status during 
World War I confirmed the unions' political“neutrality" 
The mere existence of a“socialist" or“labor" party does not 
necessarily indicate political unionism. The essential question is 
whether unions are used primarily as machinery for job con frol 
or for achieving political power. De且nedin this way, it is clear 
that the German labor movement m tl百五rsthalf-century of 
Germany’S industrial revolution, moved from political to non-
political unionism. 
British unionism might appear to have taken the opposite 
comse.＜匁〕 Asearly as the 1850’s British unions were given legal 
recogmt10n and some protect10n，“with the田dof middle-class 
friends.”Only from 1871-1875 was picketing illegal. Unions 
orgamzed mutual bene白tfunds, eschewed extensive social legis司
lation, became craft-, not class目， conscious,and developed their 
own rank and自leleadership. Only in the depression of the early 
(33) Perlman hinted at one factor when he said“Given the opportunity 
to exist legally. , the trade-union mentality wil eventually come to 
dominate ”Quoted in Philip M. Kaiser, "Discussions z’， IRRA, Pro-
ceedings, 1954, p. 176. 
(34) See Perl四回， oP.cit., Chapter 4. 
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1890’s did unionists see the need for more aggressive political 
leadership ，吐iesocialist' gave it to them m both the trade unio丘
町idthe political五eld. The Taff Vale declSlon of 1901, allowmg 
μnions to be med for damages, even as a consequence of legal 
acts, created a new need for political action. But even after the 
formation, of the British Labor Party in 1906, the Trade Union 
Council, which was cle町 lynot dominated by the party, never lost 
its primary concern for job security. When labor came to power, 
the“pure”trade umomsm of the TUC was so ingrained that it 
refused to relinqmsh union rights of job control even to a Social-
ist government as employer.C町 Itis obvious that the TUC was 
not used primarily as machinery for achieving political power. 
Thus British unionism, though politically conscious, is not m the 
strictest sense“political”． 
In the Philippines the post”war peak of political trade union-
ism, under Communist leadership, came m 1949 This was caused 
by a combination of inflationary pressure, increased insecurity of 
union organizatrons，組dinadequate social secun ty or minimum 
wage legislat1on-with no prospect of improvement. By late 1953 
the economic, legal, and administrative climate of trade unionism 
had improved, at the same time the most radical political leader” 
ship was removed It is not rnrprising, therefore, that the 
character of the umon movement changed also. 
Structural These cyclical determinants do help to explain, 
therefore, the shifts of emphasis in the lustory of a natronal trade 
umon movement. But if one should want, mstead, to compare 
Britain with G百 many,or Europe with Asia, or tl四 Ph;lippmes
with its neighbors, one must co江cen甘ateon structural rather than 
cyclical factors, i. e. on more permanent aspects of the national 
culture. Structural determinants of the character of a labor move-
rnent may be classified under the headings politico-legal, social, 
economic, and ideological. The American invironmen t made job-
conscious unionism inevitable m the U. S., but as we shall see it 
is not so everywhere. 
One of the most ofιme江tionedand most obvious d.eterminants 
(35) See Kaiser, op. cit , pp. 173-174. 
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of labor’s political role is the electoral system. A presidential 
system which usually requrres a national majority to elect, or at 
least gives an absolute advantage to the party w1也 aplurality, 
as泊 theU. S. or the Phihppmes, is a strong, perhaps decisive, 
deterrent to the development of third parties. (Wi正hina par!ia-
mentary system，。fcourse, the single member district, in com-
P町 isonw1也 anytype of electoral list, alrn discourages third 
parties, but not so effectively. It at least presses third parties to 
extend their class basis rapidly in order to become number two, as 
in Britain.) Since the traditional pattern for socialist or labor 
p町 ties1s to e皿ergefirst as third parties vy四gwith two C叩－
servative gro叫pmgs,e. g. in Great Britam or Japan, d;scourage-
m回 tfor a也irdp町 tyis disc泊uragementfor a labor party also. 
Though a labor party does not necessarily mean polit>cal uniomsm, 
it is certainly an indispensable part of it. The Philippines is the 
only country in Asia, besides Vie回am,with a constitutionally s廿ong
and popul町 lyd回世d president眠 We have already wit阻essed
th町ethe inherent instability of a出irdparty which does enter 
the五eld.
Another politrcal factor of some importance for the labor 
movement is the extent of suffrage in a country and the period 
at which it was granted.＜目lThe dis聞 franchis白nent of laborers 
during the early growth of unions in England and Germany, for 
example, contributed to a feeling of class consciousness anrl be-
came one of也efoci1 of labor’s political agitation. In the U S., 
however, umversal manhood 田町ragepreceded umon development, 
so that org阻 izedlabor, from the五rst,could participa田 inthe 
elect町 alpro白 SSOロalegally equal footing with other economic 
groups. The Ph1hpがnepattern is more similar to the American 
than is any other in Asia. In 1916, shortly before the五rstsignifi-
cant growth of廿adeunions, the Philippines was granted umversal 
literate manhood suffrage, with the hteracy qualification so hb訂－
ally mterpreted as to be a mmor handicap for those who really 
wanted to vote. In contrast, univ町田4皿anhood田町ragewas a 
battle cry of the Japanese labor movement for a再enera t10n and 
(36) See Perlman, op cit , p. 167. 
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the subject of agitation for a decade before it took effect in 1928 
When labor had to fight for the franchise, i臼 political・conscious” 
ness was understandably mtensi五ed.
As already noted, changes in the legal cli血 atefor umon佃d
leftwing political act1v1ty cause cyclical sh江tsin the charac也rof 
the labor田ove皿ent. In the long run too, di出eringlegal climates 
in d宜erentcountries help determine distinct labor union develop-
men t. Governments ruling m the civil law trad1t1on have always 
regulated economic relations in more detail than those m common 
law countries. The greater the degree of legal mtervention h 也e
national economic life, the皿oreimportant becomes power over 
legislation, and the courts, for a labor movement. The contrast 
between civil law France, Germany, and Italy, on the one hand, 
and common law Britam血rdthe U. S , on the o出er,is clear. 
Japan, emerging from a feudal period m which government ・at-
tempted to regulate eveηF detail of private life, borrowed heavily 
in the process of Westernization from也eGerman legal sys加盟．
In colornal Asia the皿etropolitantraditions were imposed on 
indigenous legal systems. For the Philippines this has meant some 
confusion. Spain brought civil law, which the American regime 
modified, but did not entirely田taside. Through the practice of 
stare decisis, the Philippme Supreme Court introduce many 
American legal precedents. Furthermore, the Philippme's most 
important pieces of labor legislation workmen’s compensat10n, 
nimimum wage, and industrial peace acts-are consciously pat-
terned after A皿ericanlaw. Thus today Philippine labor leg1sla-
tion and judicial practice contains both American and Spanish 
elements, but is closer to the former. 
Philippine social leg1slat10n, though not so comprehensive as 
to stifle trade unionism, has been liberal enough and was enacted 
early enough m the history of the labor movement to reduce 
signi五cantly incentives for umons to achieve politic al power in 
order to improve upon the existmg law. 〔Therecent Social 
Security Act, however, if fully implemented, will encroach on the 
bene五tsystems which unions have already won by collective 
bargaming, and has been recognized by some leaders as a threat 
274 
to strong unionism 〕
Sey田ourLipset has stated very clearly the signi亘canceof some 
of these same factors m deterτurning labor’s politic al role : (37) 
... Where the workers were demed economic and political 
citizenship rights, their struggle for redis甘1butionof income and 
sta出swas superlillposed on a revolutionary ideology. Where 
the economic and status struggle developed outside this conteJ<t, 
the ideology with which it was hnked. tended to be that of 
gradualist reform白血
Gradualist reformism is not identical with non-political umon-
ism, nor revolutionary ideology with poht1cal umomsm, but their 
is considerable correlation in both cases. 
Closely rela担dto the politico”legal (actors 、，vhich・help to de-
termine labor’S poli tlcal comple担 onis the impact on the labor 
movement of the role of government・ itself in economic activity. 
The greater the numb巳rof state-owned enterprises, the more 
lrm1ted are the rrgh臼 ofcollective bargaining and the right to 
strike, fordng labor to seek concess;ons by other means. And if 
state enterprises are operated by comervative governments, as has 
been the case in Germany and Japan, wor主ersare more hkely to 
look upon sta胎 controlunder labor governments as the most 
五easiblesolt山 onto their di伍culties Even without state owner-
ship, extensive and closely supervised ~conomic planning tends to 
place the state in a position of 四 pportingwage control, no 
matter what its long range welfare goals may be This too stimu-
lates political activity by unoons.・ 
No major industrial nation has had less state enterprise than 
the U.S., which is one of the important causes for non目political
unionism in that country. Likewise, the Phrhppines stands in 
somewhat the same rolatron to Asia as the U. S. does to Europe. 
Government plays a smaller role m economic development in the 
Philipprnes than in almost any other Asian country, even though 
the Philippine government 1s stil operating several enterpnses 
(37）“Some Social Requisites of Democ四 cy. Economrc Development and 
Political Legitimacy.ぺAmmcanPalitica/ Science R四iew,LIII (March 
1959), p 93. 
S白neNot田 onthe Poht<cal Role of Labor Movements' 275 
established by the Commonwealth before the war.C38〕 Thetrend 
1s now toward even les governmental activity. Some government 
corporations are being sold to private business, and some political 
leaders w1 th business b号ckgroundsask for “the end of al controls ” 
with as much vehemence as出lanti-New Dealer m the 1930 s. 
(Controls on trade show no signs of abating, but they have only 
a very mdrrect e能 cton labor.) Even也atgovernment enterprise 
which does exist, however, such as the Manila Railroad, shipyards, 
textJle mills, etc., has not had the deademng influence on job-
on en ted trade unionism that凶 ghthave been expεcted, since 
govern田 ent corpora tion e皿ployees, an important segment of 
unionized workers, have been permitted to b町 gamcollect1vely 
and to strike Furthermore, a few such corporations now mclude 
union leaders among their directors. Considering this aspect of 
the government's economic role, therefore, non-politcal unionism 
m the Ph1日ppinesis understandable, and no political tendency 
should be ex pee ted 
The govern田entdo白 notmanifest its economic ;nfluence only 
through the ownersh1p of enterprise, however, but also through 
its control over the monetary勾rstem. A government wh:ch is 
able to prevent rapid mflation is able at the sameむmeto dis-
courage political unionism, for mflation問 movesrespons1bility for 
the level of real wages from the hands of the employer組 djust1-
fiably飢えmsworkers attention toward government policy ・Though 
the Philippines has had a surprising degree of price stability 
throughout most of the post-war ・period, when co皿paredwith 
other Southeast Asian countries, the last two years have witnessed 
events which would seem to mdicate that rapid mflation may be 
a real danger. Here, then, is one factor which m:1ght brrng about 
changes m the cbaracter of the Philippine labor movement. 
Social s truc回目 hasbeen another important deter皿inantof 
the character of labor movements. Class consciousness in one pre同
requisi出 ofvigorously polit1cal unionism, but is not hkely to de-
(38) Government’s role in gross fixed capit叫 Ion国土ionin 1955, according 
to the Ecortomic Survey of Asia and Far East (1956, p.194), was. Ph1bp-
pirn白， 28%;Kor担， 20%; lndia, 30河； Jap田， 41%;and Bur哩a,54%. 
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velop in a rnciety with considerable freedom for upw町 dsocial 
mobihty. The American dream of“rags to riches ", regardle8S 
of its reahty or unreality today, is so widely believed as to prevent 
even a皿od1cumof class comc1ousness a田ongAerican workers. (39) 
A' large percentage consider themselves“血iddleclass ”. This has 
been one of those factors which clearly distinguishes the British, 
and more espεcially the European, from the American scene. 
Again也ePhilippines is closer to the American pa tte口l th阻
are other Asian coun廿ies,though one must not皿 akethe mis take 
of equating Philippine and American social struc回re--ma com-
panson between 也etwo白 Philippines'would emerge as rigidly 
hierarchical As the result of a long period of Westernization, 
including intense indoctrination i立 the“American drea皿” inthe 
early 1900’s, on top of加 indigenoussociety only loosely s廿uctnred
by Asian standards, F1hpinos are today permitted a relatively high 
degree of social mobility. Fur也er皿 ore,the d四ireto rise socially 
and economically is so g四atthat it is easy for ambitious workers 
to be lured from class loyalty by也eexpectation of status and 
monetary reward within the existing societal patterns. This 
tendency has not only weakened political umonism, but “pure” 
trade unionism, as well. 
The economic prerequisite of upward social mobility is iob 
op po出血ity,created either by full employment or by a frontier, 
or both. The “dream”皿.usthave some substanceもobe believed. 
America has had fr on tier，町idhas had, with the exceptwn of a 
few periods, full e皿ployment. It was m 也isenvironment that 
Perlman could iniagme exclusively job conscious廿adeunionism 
to be inevitable.(40) To say, as Perlman did，出atoppor加mtyin 
American has been“Ii皿ited＇’isa trmsm which is of no assistance 
in at恒mptingto draw international comparisons. 
The Philippines also has had a frontier. There has been sig-
ni五c皿 tvolnn tary mass血 igrationfrom al overcrowded areas, 
except Central Luzon, to Mmdanao and to the Cagayan Valley m 
皿 Nor正hemLuzon, so世田t“goingto h五ndanao”isan alter百at1ve
(39) s曲 S.Perl田an,op. cit., pp. 165-166 
( 40) See Taft, op. cit., p. 145. 
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in the minds of many who have not chosen it. The Philippines 
has had a rapidly expandmg economy too. But now出ee田ily
accessible, highly productive free land is practically exhausted, 
and land grabbers and speculators have a hand in dis廿ibuting
much of what is left. Chronic une皿ployment,already over the 
m1lhon田町k,is growing steadily. It is these甘endswhich, if 
they contrnue for long, could kil the stil unsubstantial“Filipino 
dream ”and drive廿adeunions to espousal of radical solutions for 
the di団cult1esat h佃 d.
A rigid, hierarchical social struc国民， h addiuon to crea tmg 
class consciousness, can serve to encourage political umonism in 
another way. Since paternalism from higher to lower and defer-
ence from lower to higher is an integral part of such a 耐 ucture,
collective bargaining by workers as equals wi也 employersis, in 
that setting, a contrad日ctionin terms. Collective bargaining can 
only operate after there has been a considerable depersonalization 
of economic relations, which is，回目rn,a result of the progress 
of industrialization. But some廿aditionalsocial struc回目sare 
more easily depersonalized thap. others. Japanese society has been 
a particularly tough nut to crack, with unionism and collective 
bargaining havrng made almost no headway to date in small 
owner-managed enterprises Poliucal uniomsm makes an end run 
around e皿ployerpaternalism into a realm of activity less色ttered
hy traditional obligations to seek some of the same ends. Thus 
national unions and federations in Japan are primarily political 
instruments, while less than half the enterprise unions engage in 
collective bargaming. (41〕
In under-developed areas foreign capitalists and managers, who 
have usually in廿oducedthe corpora恒 busrnessform, have never 
k田 boundhy ties of pa ternahsm to也eirworkers. Since de-
personalization causes the worker to seek status in the union, it is 
in foreign enterpmes that unionism grows first, and with foreign 
managers that the collective bargaruing relation is most e出ily
(41) s田 SolomonB. Levine，“Lab町 Patternsand TrendsヘTheAnnals, 
Vol 308 (Nov. 1956), pp, 102-112, also“The Labor Movement and 
Economic Development in Japan ”， IRRA, Procee£Utzgs, 1954, pp. 48-59. 
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established. (In S. E. Asia one must qualify“foreign" by adding 
“Western ”， since overseas Chmese employers町eamong the most 
resistant to unionism.) In tbe Ph11ippmes tbe native entrepre-
neunal class is espocia¥ly strong, and the role of foreign enterprise 
less important in relation to that class than m some neighboring 
countries. One would thus expect that this situation would deter 
the spread of collective bargammg, and to some・ extent it has. 
But, counter-balanced by a relat:,vely open society, it has not 
made a noticeable contr.ibution to poht:cal.un10nism. 
Paradoxically, with the illtroducton of one other factor, 
nationafom, the p児 senceof foreign employers may actually assist 
the growth of political unionism. In Indonesia, for example，吐ie
large number of foreign e孔terprisesha' caused resentment. Nat10n-
alist sentJment directed against Dutchmen has identified cap1tahsm 
and colonialism, thus皿akingsocialism patriotic. Such sentiment 
has given a substantial boost to the most pol山calkind of trade 
umomsm. 
One attribute of a loosely structured society is that educaaonal 
opportunities are available for workers. Compared to Europe, this 
was true of America, thus providing an additional impetus to the 
development of rank and file union leadεrsh1p. Compared to吐目
白 stof Southeast Asia, the Ph1hppines bas provided unusual edu-
cat1onal facilities for the masses. Though this did not, m the 
past, actually produce very many unmn leaders from the ranks, 
because of the preference given lawyers by a system of judicial 
町 b1tratJon,it now provid回吐iebaSJs for a fairly sophistica臼d
labor educatユonprogram designed to traτn such leadership. Said 
Perlman of the labor movement，“Given the opportun.ity to .・－
develop a leadership from its own r阻 ks,the trade uロmnmentahty 
will eventually come to dominate.”Free, compulsory elementary 
education and one of the hjghest hteracy rates in the worlld did 
not produce e:i ther rank and file leaderslup or“trade un10江 inen-
tahty”m pre-war Japan, however. As already mentioned, other 
social factors were pr<iducmg con廿arytendenc1es.C42) 。2) See Solomon Levine, Jn由叫γialRe/at加zsin Pastwar ]aqan (U出回a'
University of Illinois ~ress, 1958〕， pp.59-66. 
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The question of leadership, and necessanly of !deology, leads 
us to consider a complex of factors affecting trade unions’develop同
ment wh'ch is peculiar to Asia In Europe and, with quali自cation,
in the U.S. so口al;stand trade union ideology, growing out of obser-
vations of the social impact of industrialization, developed only 
slightly later than the growth of an urban labor class. Thus 
idεology mteracted with trade union experience, while rank and 
日leleade"'hip developed side by side with intellectual leadersh:p. 
In fact, m Br.itain labor leaders had considerable practical experi-
ence before socialism gained cu口encyamong trade unions. In 
Asia, however, trade un'on and rncialist philosophy was imported 
from the West at about the same time as industrialization. In 
Southeast Asia there was little industnal labor and almost no trade 
uniomsm before the Bolshevik revolution In Japan a pre-Bolshト
vik socialism was introduced w1thm a few years after the begin-
ning of industrialization m the 1880's. Politically”minded intel-
lectuals，εqurpped with a full-blown sociahst philosophy were the 
founders of a maior segment of the Asian trade uロマonmovernen t.
In most countries “pure”trade unionism never had a chance. In 
addition to the social and cultural barriers to collective bargaming, 
rank and自leleadership was lacking. Nor was rt encouraged by 
the intelligentsia. 
In the Philippines, the timing was agarn slightly different. 
Industries were established somewhat回 rforthan elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia, and numerous workers 出 soc1a白onsof d1旺erent
types had sprung up in and around h在amlabefore E在arxismwas 
introduced in 1925. There was thus already in existence experi-
enced non-Communist labor leadership to oppose the spread of 
pro-Communist unions. 
In South and Southeast Asia an additional comphcatrng 
factor was national沼田 In some periods of pre-war colonial 
rule nationalist political activity was more rigidly suppressed 
than trade union organizat10n; a few nationalist leaders therefore 
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turned to union act1v1ty as an alternative.(43) Thus the umon was 
early viewed田 apolitical tool, even by nonみ！［a口dsts. But the 
uむlizationof labor unions as a major force in the nationalist 
struggle has been for the most part a post田warpheno田ena,es・
pecmlly in Burma, Malaya. 
Perhaps the m03t important distinct:τon between the Philip-
pines and i也 closestAsian neighbors is to be found hi the d1旺er-
ing degrees of recency and intensity of the;r respective nationalist 
experiences.τbe assurance of Philipp:ine independence, to be given 
in 1946, created no incentive for either p回目waror early post-war 
nationalist leaders to multiply mass organizations to support the 
nationalist came Yet the liberation struggle was precisely the 
necessity which mo出eredthe TUC CB〕m Burma, the Confedera-
tion Generale Chretien du Trava11Ie Vie回amien,and SOBS! in 
Indonesia.τ'his is a kind of political unionism even more purely 
pohtrcal in origin and current operations than that of post司war
Japan, where the local uポonshave an economic emphasis, even 
though national unions and federations are almost exclusively con-
cerned with politics. Except for SOBS!, these unions have come 
under government control. 
In summary, then, we can say that non-political trade union-
ism is吐iePhilippine pattern, practically unique in Asia, because 
of the presidentユalsystem of government, the early granting of 
extensive suffrage, a predominantly private enterpn田 economy
plus a liberal labor policy in government corporations, consider-
able upward social mobility based on a history of Job opportunity, 
a relauvely late introduction of Ma口cism,and an easily won in” 
dependence. Increasing unemployment, vanishing free land, and 
the threat of inflation are present trends which seriously threaten 
this pattern, however. 
(43) e. g. Tan Malakka in Indonesia, Mahatma Gandhi, briefly, in India, 
and Isabelo de Ios Reyes in the Philippines, who soon learned that 
uruon。r胆血血tion w出回田町eacceptable than nat10nalist町gani四 tion 
to the colonial government. However, this phenomena was not nearly 
so widespread皿 thear阻 as1s implied by George Lichtblau, m“The 
Politics of Trade Umon L田dershipm Southern Asia ”， W,,,-/d Politics, 
VII (October 1954〕， pp.84-101. 
